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ABSTRACT 
 
Analysis of United States foreign policy is a constant in academia and 
the media.  Among the widely analyzed and hotly debated issues on U.S. 
foreign policy is its relationship with the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  Yet, there has been little research on American public opinion if the 
U.S. should be more involved with the ICC.  This paper analyzes historical 
and contemporary U.S. foreign policy on the ICC as well as American pub-
lic opinion regarding greater U.S. involvement with the court.  To accom-
plish these goals, we analyze data from the Chicago Council on Global Af-
fairs’ June 2010 Global Views survey, a nationally representative survey of 
U.S. adults.  The analysis focuses on various ICC-related topics, chief 
among them being whether the United States should join the ICC.  In ad-
dition, we examine if support for the ICC varies across various demographic 
and attitudinal variables, such as age, sex, race, income, political ideology, 
and support for multilateralism.  This issue is first examined at a bivariate 
level of analysis and then within a multivariate framework to identify the 
most salient predictors of support for the ICC. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union there has been much debate 
over United States foreign policy, particularly its role as a super-
power, its decision to enter into armed conflicts with Afghanistan 
and Iraq, its treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, and its over-
all policy concerning the war on terrorism.  Included on this list is 
debate on United States foreign policy and the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC). 
The Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted on July 17, 1998, by a 
vote of 120 to 7.1  While most United States’ allies, such as the United 
Kingdom and France, voted in favor of the statute, the United States 
was one of the seven states that voted against its adoption.2  And, 
while United States cooperation with the ICC has improved since 
the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, its foreign policy 
remains the same, and there is no indication it will join the court in 
the near future.3 
There has been overwhelming scholarship written on United 
States foreign policy and the ICC.  However, little has been written 
on public opinion and the ICC, since much of the scholarship is 
found in legal journals.  Indeed, as recently noted, “[T]he topic has 
been virtually ignored by social scientists.”4  Yet, this is an important 
issue to consider, as the position of the United States Government 
regarding the ICC may not necessarily be reflective of American 
public opinion.  Unfortunately, it is a difficult task to attempt to as-
sess public opinion of the ICC, as “barely any public opinion surveys 
have been conducted asking citizens about their attitudes towards 
the court.”5   
The goal of this paper is twofold.  First, it seeks to determine if 
United States foreign policy on the International Criminal Court reflects the 
                                               
 
1 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 9th plen. mtg. at ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.9 
(Jan. 25, 1999). 
2 See Id. ¶¶ 28, 51–52, 99 (detailing respectively, why the United States’ voted 
against the Statute, the United Kingdom’s interpretation of portions of the Statute, 
and France’s decision to vote in favor of the Statute).  
3 Harry M. Rhea, The United States and International Criminal Tribunals: An In-
troduction, in 14 Supranational Criminal Law: Capita Selecta, 207-10 (2012). 
4 Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 411, 412 (2013). 
5 Id. at 426. 
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prevailing views of the American public.  Second, it examines, in a mul-
tivariate manner, the demographic and ideological predictors of 
public support for various ICC-related activities.  To accomplish 
these goals, we analyze data from the Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs’ June 2010 Global Views survey, a nationally representative 
survey of U.S. adults.  Prior to describing the data in greater detail 
and presenting the results of our analyses, we first provide a brief 
history of the ICC and U.S. foreign policy relating to it.  We then 
discuss prior thinking and research pertaining to the manner in 
which political ideology, support for globalization, and multilater-
alism might be related to support for foreign policy in general and, 
in particular, the ICC. 
 
2.  BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ICC 
 
The Allied and Associate Powers established the Commission on 
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement 
of Penalties on January 25, 1919 to report on which states were re-
sponsible for initiating the First World War and the constitution and 
procedure of a court appropriate for criminal prosecutions of war 
criminals.6  The majority of states on the Commission favored estab-
lishing an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of Wil-
helm II, former Kaiser of Germany, who fled to the Netherlands.  
However, the United States argued against an international criminal 
tribunal and favored national and multinational trials.7  Ultimately, 
its position prevailed and an international criminal tribunal was not 
established. 
Twenty years after the end of the First World War, the League of 
Nations adopted the first treaty for a permanent international crim-
inal court.8  The purpose of the Convention for the Establishment of 
                                               
6 Draft Resolution Relative to the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
the Enforcement of Penalties (1919), reprinted in III Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919, 202 (1958).  
7 Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime 
& Punishment 31-32, 48-49 (Simon Dixon et al. eds., 2014); Rhea, supra note 3, at 21-
46; James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punish-
ing War Criminals of the First World War  75-77 (Greenwood Press 1982); Harry M. 
Rhea, The Commission on the Responsibility of the Author of the War and on Enforcement 
of Penalties and its Contribution to International Criminal Justice After WWII, 25 Crim. 
L.F. 147, 165 (2014); Harry M. Rhea, The United States and International Criminal Tri-
bunals: An Historical Analysis, 16 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 19, 20-21 (2009). 
8 Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/7
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an International Criminal Court was to prosecute violations of the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.  The 
United States was not a member of the League of Nations and did 
not participate in the negotiations. The League of Nation’s interna-
tional criminal court never came to fruition as the Convention failed 
to receive a sufficient number of ratifications prior to the impending 
Second World War.9   
Without an international criminal court to prosecute Nazis for 
their crimes during the Second World War, the United States initi-
ated the development of the International Military Tribunal at Nu-
remberg, a multinational criminal court that shared jurisdiction with 
the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France for the prosecution 
of German war criminals.10  The International Military Tribunal was 
not “international” per se; rather it was a multinational court, as 
only four States participated in the trial.11 
The United Nations General Assembly affirmed the Nuremberg 
Principles on December 11, 1946, shortly after the International Mil-
itary Tribunal completed its trial.12  Genocide was affirmed an inter-
national crime on the same day.13  The Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide was adopted on December 9, 1948.14  
The United States strongly supported its adoption, including a ref-
erence for an “international penal tribunal” in Article 6 with juris-
diction to prosecute perpetrators accused of committing genocide.15  
                                               
1937, 19 L.N.O.J. 37.  The Rome Statute is often incorrectly cited as the first adopted 
statute for a permanent international criminal court.  The Rome Statute is, however, 
the first statute of a permanent international criminal court to enter into force. 
9 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the 
Rome Statute 4 (2010); 1 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the Inter-
national Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis, and Integrated Text 24 (2005); M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary 
History 11 (1998).  
10 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Agreement for the Establishment of an International Mil-
itary Tribunal, 13 DEP’T ST. BULL. 222, 222-223 (1945) (detailing the ongoing goal of 
prosecuting German war criminals and outlining the creation of the International 
Military Tribunal). 
11 B.V.A. Röling, The Law of War and the National Jurisdiction Since 1945, in 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 329, 356 (1961). 
12 G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/95(I) (Dec. 
11, 1946). 
13 G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(I) (Dec. 
11, 1946). 
14 G.A. Res. 260 (IIII) A, U.N. GAOR, 179th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948). 
15 Harry M. Rhea, United States Foreign Policy and the International Penal Tribunal 
in the Genocide Convention: Article VI and Beyond, 9 (2) GENOCIDE STUD. INT’L 186, 187 
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Consequently, the General Assembly initiated the study of an inter-
national criminal jurisdiction immediately following the adoption of 
the Genocide Convention.16  The study was indefinitely placed on 
hold in 1954 due to the height of the Cold War and absence of a def-
inition of the crime of aggression.17 
Discussion of establishing the ICC was not resurrected again un-
til 1989, when Trinidad and Tobago submitted its draft proposal for 
the General Assembly.  The proposal was adopted on December 4, 
1989, and the International Law Commission (ILC) was invited to 
study the possibility of establishing an international criminal 
court.18  At the time the United States was suspicious of the ICC but 
thought it was worthy of discussion.19   
The United States did not fully support the early reports of the 
ILC.  Its responses complimented the ILC’s hard work but criticized 
its lack of consideration of legal questions.20  The United States 
showed the most support for the concept of the International Crim-
inal Court in 1994, after the ILC adopted a draft statute for an inter-
national criminal court.  According to David Scheffer, then Ambas-
sador at Large for War Crimes Issues, the ILC’s draft statute was a 
good starting point.21 
The General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee and, 
subsequently, the Preparatory Committee on an International Crim-
inal Court.22  At this point, United States support for the ICC began 
to diminish.  Non-government organizations played a large role in 
                                               
(2015). 
16 G.A. Res. 260 (III) B, U.N. GAOR, 179th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948). 
17 G.A. Res. 898 (IX), U.N. GAOR, 504th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/898(IX) 
(Dec. 4, 1954). 
18 G.A. Res. 44/39, U.N. GAOR, 72nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A.RES/44/39 (Dec. 
4, 1989). 
19 Rhea, supra note 3, at 156. 
20 See Comments of Governments on the report of the Working Group on the question 
of an international criminal jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/CN.4/452 (1993), reprinted in 
[1993] II(I) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, at 141-143 (outlining the United States’ comments 
including its opinion on the jurisdiction of the court and surrender of defendants 
to the court).   
21 Interview with David J. Scheffer, former Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes Issues (June 24, 2008). 
22 G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/53 (Dec. 
9, 1994) (establishing ad hoc committee); G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 87th plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 (Dec. 11, 1995) (establishing preparatory commit-
tee). 
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molding the legal procedures of the ICC.  Many States and non-gov-
ernment organizations did not approve of the Court being closely 
related to the Security Council and wanted an independent prose-
cutor to be free to open investigations proprio motu.23  The United 
States favored a larger role for the Security Council and greater 
checks and balances on the prosecutor.24  These issues were unre-
solved, and the United States delegation at Rome was instructed to 
vote against the adoption of the Rome Statute.25 
Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, but 
refused to submit it to the Senate for advise and consent for ratifica-
tion, stating that there were many concerns with the statute that 
needed to be addressed before the United States could become a 
State Party to ICC.26  The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 
2002, after the ratification of sixty States as required under Article 
126.27  Consequently, George W. Bush’s administration submitted a 
letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him 
that the United States did not intend to become a State Party to the 
ICC and that the United States had no legal obligations arising from 
Clinton’s signature.28  The United States Senate subsequently passed 
laws that prevent funding the ICC and allows the United States to 
use any means necessary to regain custody of a United States na-
tional being held for prosecution.29  
                                               
23 Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm’n on the Establishment of an International Crim-
inal Court, Apr. 3, 1995-Apr. 13, 1995, Aug. 14, 1995-Aug. 25, 1995, UN Doc. 
A/50/22, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22 (1995), at ¶¶ 25, 113, 114.  See also Silvia A. Fer-
nandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 175, 176-77 (Roy S. Lee ed., 
1999); SCHABAS, supra note 9, at 176-77. 
24 Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on International Op-
erations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 147 (1998) (statement of 
the United States Delegation). See SCHABAS, supra note 9, at 178 (“Department of 
State spokesman James Rubin had warned: ‘If neither the Security Council nor any 
state endorses action by the Court, the prosecutor would act without a critical and 
essential base of international consensus.’”). 
25 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes 
Tribunals 224 (Eric D. Weitz ed. 2012). 
26 Schabas, supra note 9, at 28. 
27 Id. at 23; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
28 Letter from John R. Bolton to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Regarding the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (April 27, 2002), in 
41 I.L.M. 1014 (2002).  
29 See e.g., Schabas, supra note 9, at 30–31 (quoting the American Service Mem-
bers’ Protection Act of 2002 in which its preamble states several ways that the U.S. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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3. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
The ICC is an affirmation by the international community that 
the most serious crimes shall not go unpunished.30  The crimes 
within the ICC's jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and the crime of aggression.31  There are three ways the 
Court may exercise its jurisdiction:  first, a State Party to the Rome 
Statute may refer a situation to the Office of the Prosecutor; second, 
the United Nations Security Council may refer a situation to the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor using its Chapter 7 authority under the United 
Nations Charter; third, the Prosecutor can open an investigation at 
his or her discretion if there is sufficient evidence from reliable 
sources that one of the crimes under Article 5 has been committed.32 
The ICC operates under the principle of complementarity.33  
States have jurisdiction over their territories and nationals, and the 
ICC cannot interfere with a situation if national courts are willing 
and able to investigate and prosecute international crimes.  How-
ever, if a national court is either unable or unwilling to prosecute, 
then the ICC's jurisdiction is triggered under the principle of com-
plementarity.  Therefore, the ICC is a court of last resort so that per-
petrators of the most serious international crimes do not go unpun-
ished. 
Currently the ICC has not lived up to the expectations of its sup-
porters.  As of August 2014, the Court has only completed three tri-
als:  two of the verdicts were guilty and one was an acquittal.34  The 
lack of success may not be the fault of the Court, as it does not have 
the resources that most national jurisdictions enjoy.  For example, 
there is no international police force to enforce arrest warrants and 
apprehend the accused.  The Court also lacks sufficient financial 
support from the Assembly of States Parties, the governing body of 
the Court.  The Security Council has referred two situations to the 
Office of the Prosecutor that prohibit the use of United Nations 
                                               
is prohibited from cooperating with the International Criminal Court). 
30 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 27, at Preamble. 
31 Id. at art. 5. 
32 Id. at art. 13. 
33 Id. at Preamble, art. 1. 
34 Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situa-
tions%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/7
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funds to support the investigations.35  Moreover, the African Union 
has lost confidence in the Court and claims it is biased against Africa 
as all of its investigations are in the region.36 
 
4.  CURRENT UNITED STATES - ICC RELATIONS 
 
The United States relationship with the ICC is friendlier today 
than in the past.  While United States law prohibits funding the ICC, 
it supports the Court when they share a common goal.  For example, 
the United States established its War Crimes Rewards Program in 
2013.  Under the War Crimes Rewards Program the United States 
offers rewards up to $5 million to persons who provide information 
regarding certain persons who have been charged with international 
crimes, including those wanted by the ICC.37 
The United States also recently supported a draft resolution to 
the Security Council referring the situation in Syria to the ICC.38  
However, United States support for the proposal has been criticized 
since it supported sending the situation in Syria to the ICC after 
China and Russia confirmed they would veto the proposal.39  While 
this support would not have occurred during the Bush administra-
tion, it does not indicate that the United States supports, or is work-
ing towards joining, the ICC. 
There were expectations that the Obama Administration would 
change United States foreign policy towards the ICC.40  This has not 
been the case.  There has been no change in federal law preventing 
financial support for the Court, and the United States continues to 
                                               
35 S.C. Res. ¶ 4–8, 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 1593, 
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
36 Charles Chernor Jalloh, Africa and the International Criminal Court: Collision 
Course or Cooperation, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 203, 209 (2012); Kurt Mills, Bashir Is Di-
viding Us: Africa and the International Criminal Court, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 404, 432 (2012). 
37 War Crimes Rewards Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/wcrp/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
38 Colum Lynch, U.S. to Support ICC War Crimes Prosecution in Syria, THE CABLE 
(May 7, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/exclusive-u-s-to-support-
icc-war-crimes- prosecution-in-syria/. 
39 See, e.g., Mark Kersten, Unnecessary and Counter-Productive: Samantha Power 
Explains US Position on ICC & Syria, JUST. IN CONFLICT (May 28, 2014), http://justice-
inconflict.org/2014/05/28/unnecessary-counter-productive-samantha-power-ex-
plains-us-position-on-icc-syria/ (outlining inconsistences in the U.S. explanation 
for putting forward the resolution). 
40 RHEA, supra note 3, at 200–01. 
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protect itself from its jurisdiction although it supports ad hoc inter-
national criminal tribunals established by the UN Security Council.41  
These courts have limited temporal and territorial jurisdiction over 
certain crimes.  The support for ad hoc tribunals has resulted in the 
misperception that the United States inconsistently supports inter-
national criminal courts, when in fact its foreign policy on a perma-
nent international criminal court has been consistent since the First 
World War.42   
 
5. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ICC 
 
Thus far most of the scholarship written on United States and 
ICC relations focuses on law, foreign policy, and international rela-
tions.  What is missing from scholarly debate is American public 
opinion on the ICC and an examination of the factors that correlate 
with support for it.  As one scholar has written, “. . . [W]e know sur-
prisingly little about public support for international courts . . .  
[T]he topic has been virtually ignored by social scientists.”43  How-
ever, there are exceptions to this.  For example, in 2003, the Pew 
Global Attitudes Survey asked citizens in the United States and four 
European countries if the International Criminal Court should have 
the opportunity to prosecute national military personnel accused of 
war crimes if their governments refused to prosecute them.44  In an 
analysis of this data, Voeten found that a minority of Americans 
(37%) was supportive of ICC prosecutions as described.45 
In addition to the 2003 Pew Survey, Gallup’s 2005 Voice of the 
People study surveyed citizens from sixty-seven countries and the 
province of Kosovo.46  Similar to Voeten's analysis of the 2003 Pew 
                                               
41 The United States has strongly supported temporary international criminal 
tribunals established by the Security Council, including the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  See RHEA, 
supra note 3, at 201.  
42 See generally RHEA, supra note 3. 
43 Voeten, supra note 4, at 412. 
44 PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, VIEWS OF A CHANGING 
WORLD 101 (2003), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2003/06/Views-
Of-A-Changing-World-2003.pdf.  See also Voeten, supra note 4, at 426 (reaffirming 
the questions asked in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey). 
45 Voeten, supra note 4, at 426. 
46 Gallup Int’l Ass’n, Voice of the People, 2005, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM 
FOR POL. AND SOC. RES. (July 16, 207), http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04636.v1.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/7
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Survey, among participants of the Gallup study from the United 
States, a greater percentage held unfavorable views of the ICC than 
favorable views.  In addition, Voeten found that citizenries who 
were more favorable toward the United Nations, and perhaps global 
governance more generally, tended to hold more favorable opinions 
of the International Criminal Court.47  Outside of Voeten's analysis 
of the 2003 Pew study and 2005 Gallup study, we are unaware of 
any other academic publications that have examined U.S. public 
opinion of the ICC and its correlates.   
 
6.  THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
In light of the limited attention given to U.S. public opinion of 
the ICC and the factors that predict support for the ICC in the aca-
demic literature, additional research is warranted.  To that end, we 
analyze U.S. public opinion data focused on various ICC-related 
topics, chief among them being whether the United States should 
join the ICC.  In addition, we examine if support for the ICC varies 
across various demographic and attitudinal variables, such as age, 
sex, race, income, political ideology, and support for multilateral-
ism.  This issue is first examined at a bivariate level of analysis and 
then within a multivariate framework to identify the most salient 
predictors of support for the ICC.   
Given that public opinion of international courts, including the 
ICC, strongly correlates “with attitudes towards the international 
organizations most closely associated with a particular court and 
with legal values more generally,”48 we anticipated that individuals 
who support globalization, who feel the U.S. should play a more 
prominent role in world affairs, and who more strongly support a 
multilateral viewpoint would be more likely to indicate support for 
the ICC and its functions.  Conversely, we anticipated that individ-
uals who more strongly identify themselves as Republican would be 
less likely to indicate support for the ICC.  The attitudes of Ameri-
                                               
See also Voeten, supra note 4, at 427 (reaffirming the scope of the Voice of the People 
survey). 
47 Voeten, supra note 4, at 427.  This was a macro-level (country-level) analysis 
and not based on individual-level data.  See Id. at 428 (displaying data points as 
countries and not by individual). 
48 Id. at 413. 
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cans regarding the ICC often correlate with political ideology.  Me-
dia outlets and literature perceive more Democrats than Republi-
cans support greater American participation in multilateral institu-
tions.  Most conservative groups that support the Republican 
ideology, including the Heritage Foundation and the American En-
terprise Institute, support no U.S. involvement in the International 
Criminal Court.   
 
6.1. Data 
 
Data for the current study come from the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs’ June 2010 Global Views survey,49 conducted by 
Knowledge Networks.  Participants for the Global Views survey 
were recruited using a combination of random-digit dialing (RDD) 
and addressed-based probability sampling methods to produce a 
nationally-representative sample of U.S. adults ages 18 and older.  
Administration of the surveys took place online; participants were 
provided with access to the Internet and hardware if needed.  The 
survey elicited valid data from approximately 2,600 respondents.  
As reported by Knowledge Networks, the response rate was 66%.  
For some of the items on the survey, a random selection of half 
of the participants were asked to provide responses.  This was true 
of the items relating to the ICC.  Thus, the current analysis focuses 
on information reported on by approximately 1,300 respondents.  As 
was expected given the random nature of selection, a t-test exami-
nation of mean level differences in participant age, race, gender, ed-
ucation, and income between the randomly selected participants 
who responded to the ICC survey items and those who were not 
selected revealed no statistically significant differences.  All analyses 
to be presented were executed using the post-stratification sampling 
weight provided by Knowledge Networks to account for the com-
plex nature of the sampling design. 
 
  
                                               
49 Marshall M. Bouton, Steven Kull, Benjamin Page, Silvia Veltcheva, & 
Thomas Wright, Global Views 2010: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 
RESOURCE CTR. FOR MINORITY DATA (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ 
icpsrweb/ RCMD/studies/31022. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/7
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6.2. ICC Variables 
 
Three items on the survey pertained to public sentiment regard-
ing the ICC.  The first item asked, "Based on what you know, do you 
think the U.S. should or should not participate in the agreement on 
the International Criminal Court that can try individuals for war 
crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity if their own country 
won't try them?"  Potential responses included "Should Participate," 
"Should Not Participate," and a category indicating the respondent 
was not sure or refused to answer.  Of the 1,277 participants queried, 
70.3% said the U.S. should participate, 26.2% indicated the U.S. 
should not participate, and 3.5% refused or were not sure. Thus, by 
this measure of Supporting Participation in the ICC, the vast major-
ity of the U.S. public supports participation, despite the fact that the 
U.S. does not currently participate. 
The second item on the survey relating to the ICC read, "Some 
say that because of the increasing interaction between countries, we 
need to strengthen international institutions to deal with shared 
problems.  Others say this would only create bigger, unwieldy bu-
reaucracies.  Please tell me if the ICC needs to be strengthened."  Po-
tential responses included, "Yes, Needs to Be Strengthened," "No, 
Doesn't Need to Be Strengthened," and a category for "not sure" and 
refusals.  Of the 1,300 respondents queried, 50.1% said the ICC needs 
to be strengthened, 41.5% indicated the ICC doesn't need to be 
strengthened, and 8.4% refused or were not sure.  Thus, while less 
dramatic than the differences in the distribution of responses to the 
first measure, the Support for Strengthening the ICC measure re-
veals that a majority of the U.S. public does feel the ICC needs 
strengthening, if only by a modest margin. 
The third item on the survey relating to the ICC read, "In order 
to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or 
oppose the trial of suspected terrorists in the International Criminal 
Court."  Potential responses included, "Favor," "Oppose," and a cat-
egory for "not sure" and refusals.  Of the 1,278 respondents queried, 
75.0% said they favor the trial of suspected terrorists in the ICC, 
20.0% indicated they do not favor it, and 5.0% refused or were not 
sure.  Thus, as with the first ICC-related measure, the Support for 
the ICC Trying Terrorists measure shows that a clear majority of the 
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American public endorses the ICC, at least with regard to trying sus-
pected terrorists.50  
 
6.3. Demographic Variables 
 
In order to assess whether various demographic variables are re-
lated to responses to the three ICC-related items on the survey, the 
present analysis includes information on respondent age, gender, 
race, education, income, and political identification.  Respondent 
age is a continuous measure provided in whole years; gender is 
coded as male and female (female is the reference category = 0 in the 
multivariate models); race is categorized into White and Nonwhite, 
as 75% of the sample was White (White is the reference category = 0 
in the multivariate models).  Respondent education is a four-cate-
gory ordinal measure with four response options of "less than high 
school" (=1); "high school diploma" (=2), "some college" (=3), and 
"bachelor's degree or higher" (=4).  Income is an ordinal measure 
with nineteen categories ranging from "Less than $5,000" (=1) to 
"$175,000 or more" (=19).  Last, political identification was measured 
using a seven-category scale that asked respondents, "Do you gen-
erally think of yourself as..."  Responses ranged from "Strong Repub-
lican" (=1) to "Strong Democrat" (7).  Thus, higher scores for this item 
indicate a respondent who more closely identifies as being a Demo-
crat. 
 
6.4. Worldview Variables 
 
In addition to considering the relationships between responses 
to the ICC measures and the demographic variables, we also drew 
on items included in the survey to capture aspects of respondent at-
titudes and opinions concerning international affairs.  First, re-
spondents were asked, "Do you believe that globalization, especially 
the increasing connections of our economy with others around the 
world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States?" Re-
                                               
50 For the bivariate and multivariate analyses to follow, the small number of 
refusals and responses of "not sure" were treated as missing, enabling us to provide 
a more straightforward method of investigating how support/lack of support for 
different aspects of the ICC are related to the variables to be described shortly. 
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sponses options included, "Mostly Good," "Mostly Bad," and a cate-
gory for "not sure" or refusal to answer.  For the multivariate analy-
sis, refusals/responses of "not sure" were treated as missing, and 
"Mostly Bad" was treated as the reference category (= 0) for the Sup-
port for Globalization measure.  Second, respondents were asked, 
"Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take 
an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?”  
Response options included, "Active Part," "Stay Out," and a category 
for "not sure" or refusal to answer.  For the multivariate analysis, 
refusals/responses of "not sure" were treated as missing, and "Stay 
Out" was treated as the reference category (= 0) for the Active in 
World Affairs measure. 
Third, we constructed a measure tapping respondent Multilat-
eralism based on responses to three items (α = .63).51  Specifically, 
respondents were asked, "Below is a list of possible foreign policy 
goals that the United States might have.  For each one please select 
whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy 
goal of the United States (=3), a somewhat important foreign policy 
goal (=2), or not an important goal at all (=1)."  The three goals we 
included to measure respondent multilateralism were:  protecting 
weaker nations against foreign aggression, strengthening the United 
Nations, and promoting and defending human rights in other coun-
tries.  The measure for multilateralism was created by taking the av-
erage of the scores for the 3 items; higher scores represent greater 
support for multilateralism. 
 
6.5. Analysis Plan 
 
The analysis proceeded in two steps.  First, we constructed a se-
ries of bivariate cross-tabs as a preliminary means to assessing the 
association between each of the three ICC measures and the demo-
graphic and worldview variables; F-tests were used to determine 
whether these bivariate associations were statistically significant.  
The second part of the analysis involved conducting a series of lo-
gistic regressions to assess the extent to which each of the demo-
graphic and worldview variables predict support for each of the 
                                               
51 Given that alpha values are partially a function of the number of items in-
cluded in a scale, failure to meet the conventional threshold of 0.70 is not unex-
pected.  Further, as we will demonstrate, the three-item measure is related to the 
ICC measures in expected ways.  
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three ICC-related measures while controlling for each of the other 
demographic and worldview variables simultaneously.  As re-
sponses to each of the ICC-related items we have described can be 
viewed as implicitly endorsing or failing to endorse the ICC, the re-
sponses of "Should Participate," "Does Need Strengthening," and 
"Favor" that correspond to each of the respective ICC items are 
coded as values of 1, while "Should Not Participate," "Doesn't Need 
Strengthening," and "Oppose" are coded as values of 0.  Because re-
fusals and "not sure" responses have been set to missing values, lo-
gistic regression is justified when analyzing variables with only two 
values (i.e., 0 and 1). 
 
7.  RESULTS 
 
7.1. Bivariate Analyses 
 
Table 1 provides the results of the cross-tab analysis describing 
the percent of respondents who support U.S. participation in the 
ICC.  As can be seen, across each of the variables, a substantive ma-
jority of U.S. adults are in favor of the U.S. participating in the ICC.  
At the same time, significant differences did emerge across certain 
variables.  Specifically, respondents with more education, who iden-
tify themselves and increasingly aligned with Democrats, who view 
globalization as a good thing, who feel the U.S. should play a more 
active role in world affairs, and who hold a more multilateral view-
point are statistically more likely to support U.S. participation in the 
ICC.  For example, whereas only 61% of respondents with less than 
a high school diploma support U.S. participation in the ICC, that 
percentage rises to 72% among respondents who have at least a 
bachelor's degree.  Likewise, only 65% of respondents with a score 
for multilateralism of 2.00 or less support U.S. participation in the 
ICC, whereas 85% of respondents with a maximum score of 3.00 for 
multilateralism support U.S. participation in the ICC.  
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Table 2 provides the results of the cross-tab analysis describing 
the percent of respondents who support strengthening the ICC.  Un-
like the broad consensus for U.S. participation in the ICC, overall 
public sentiment as to whether the ICC needs to be strengthened is 
more equivocal. However, significant differences are evinced across 
various personal attributes and opinions of respondents.  In partic-
ular, females, Nonwhites, participants who are increasingly aligned 
with Democrats, and those holding a more multilateral position are 
Age (N=1236) Political Identification (N=1236)
18-24 73.16% Strong Republican 60.72%
25-39 73.55% Not Strong Republican 70.52%
40-59 72.20% Leans Reublican 67.49%
60+ 72.85% Undecided 70.23%
* Measure collapsed for simplification Leans Democrat 84.21%
* F-test not significant Not Strong Democrat 78.47%
Strong Democrat 81.88%
Gender (N=1236) * F-test significant at p<.001
Male 72.00%
Female 73.73% View of Globalization (N = 1210)
* F-test not significant Mostly Bad 67.12%
Mostly Good 77.14%
Race (N=1236) * F-test significant at p<.01
White 71.74%
NonWhite 75.48% Opinion on World Affairs (N=1223)
* F-test not significant Stay Out 62.59%
Play Active Part 77.40%
Education (N=1236) * F-test significant at p<.001
Less than H.S. 61.09%
H.S. Diploma 74.82% Multilateralism (N=1234)
Some College 76.41% 1.00 - 2.00 64.59%
Bachelors + 71.90% 2.01 - 2.99 81.55%
* F-test significant at p<.05 3.00 84.94%
* Measure collapsed for simplification
Income (N=1236) * F-test significant at p<.001
$0 - $24,999 72.90%
$25,000 - $49,999 75.96%
$50,000 - $84,999 73.21%
$85,000+ 68.85%
* Measure collapsed for simplification
* F-test not significant
Responses of "not sure" and refusals were set to missing
Table 1. Percent of Respondents Supporting U.S. Participation in the ICC by Various Attributes
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more likely to feel the ICC needs strengthening (there are marginally 
significant differences for the globalization and world affairs varia-
bles). Conversely, respondents with more education and who have 
a larger income are less likely to feel the ICC needs strengthening.  
Differences in the percent of respondents feeling the ICC needs 
strengthening are particularly pronounced according to respondent 
political alignments:  Only 36% of participants who view themselves 
as strong Republicans feel the ICC needs to be strengthened, 
whereas 67% of participants who view themselves as strong Demo-
crats feel the ICC needs to be strengthened.  A similar contrast is 
seen across scores for multilateralism:  only 43% of respondents with  
 
 
Age (N=1205) Political Identification (N=1205)
18-24 51.94% Strong Republican 35.72%
25-39 58.27% Not Strong Republican 54.53%
40-59 52.65% Leans Reublican 34.78%
60+ 54.63% Undecided 59.33%
* Measure collapsed for simplification Leans Democrat 65.33%
* F-test not significant Not Strong Democrat 58.44%
Strong Democrat 66.98%
Gender (N=1205) * F-test significant at p<.001
Male 49.87%
Female 59.52% View of Globalization (N = 1189)
* F-test significant at p<.01 Mostly Bad 50.75%
Mostly Good 57.47%
Race (N=1205) * F-test significant at p<.10
White 50.97%
NonWhite 63.47% Opinion on World Affairs (N=1188)
* F-test significant at p<.01 Stay Out 49.61%
Play Active Part 56.52%
Education (N=1205) * F-test significant at p<.10
Less than H.S. 57.15%
H.S. Diploma 61.78% Multilateralism (N=1205)
Some College 52.46% 1.00 - 2.00 42.59%
Bachelors + 48.87% 2.01 - 2.99 61.43%
* F-test significant at p<.05 3.00 83.98%
* Measure collapsed for simplification
Income (N=1205) * F-test significant at p<.001
$0 - $24,999 66.07%
$25,000 - $49,999 56.82%
$50,000 - $84,999 49.62%
$85,000+ 45.68%
* Measure collapsed for simplification
* F-test significant at p<.001
Responses of "not sure" and refusals were set to missing
Table 2. Percent of Respondents Supporting Strengthening the ICC by Various Attributes
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a score of 2.00 or less feel the ICC needs to be strengthened, while 
84% of respondents with a maximum score of 3.00 feel the ICC needs 
to be strengthened.  
Table 3 provides the results of the cross-tab analysis describing 
the percent of respondents who support having the ICC bring sus-
pected terrorists to trial.  As was true regarding support for having 
the U.S. participate in the ICC, the overwhelming majority of the 
U.S. public supports having the ICC bring suspected terrorists be-
fore the court.  Even among participants who call themselves strong 
Republicans, 70% of such individuals support bringing suspected 
terrorists before the ICC.  Still, we do find evidence of meaningful 
Age (N=1215) Political Identification (N=1215)
18-24 82.13% Strong Republican 70.00%
25-39 79.15% Not Strong Republican 74.58%
40-59 77.00% Leans Reublican 70.72%
60+ 80.69% Undecided 79.27%
* Measure collapsed for simplification Leans Democrat 87.28%
* F-test not significant Not Strong Democrat 83.46%
Strong Democrat 86.40%
Gender (N=1215) * F-test significant at p<.01
Male 75.84%
Female 81.74% View of Globalization (N = 1190)
* F-test significant at p<.05 Mostly Bad 70.71%
Mostly Good 84.59%
Race (N=1215) * F-test significant at p<.001
White 79.20%
NonWhite 78.48% Opinion on World Affairs (N=1199)
* F-test not significant Stay Out 73.45%
Play Active Part 81.45%
Education (N=1215) * F-test significant at p<.05
Less than H.S. 74.99%
H.S. Diploma 76.68% Multilateralism (N=1213)
Some College 83.56% 1.00 - 2.00 73.14%
Bachelors + 78.70% 2.01 - 2.99 88.60%
* F-test not significant 3.00 78.43%
* Measure collapsed for simplification
Income (N=1215) * F-test significant at p<.001
$0 - $24,999 77.01%
$25,000 - $49,999 81.28%
$50,000 - $84,999 81.35%
$85,000+ 76.02%
* Measure collapsed for simplification
* F-test not significant
Responses of "not sure" and refusals were set to missing
Table 3. Percent of Respondents Supporting Having the ICC Try Terrorists by Various Attributes
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differences across individual attributes. Females, those who increas-
ingly align with Democrats, those who feel globalization is a good 
thing, those who feel the U.S should play a more active role in world 
affairs, and those who score higher on multilateralism are statisti-
cally more likely to support bringing suspected terrorists before the 
ICC, though the association for multilateralism appears to be non-
linear, as greatest support was found at the mid-range of scores.  
 
7.2. Multivariable Analyses 
 
Having examined how support for the ICC varies across a num-
ber of demographic attributes and ideological stances at the bivari-
ate level, we next examined these associations in multivariate lo-
gistic regression models.  Because bivariate analyses cannot rule out 
the potential that the statistically significant associations revealed in 
Tables 1-3 are spurious, multivariate models that can take into ac-
count the potential confounding influence of multiple variables sim-
ultaneously are needed.  As stated earlier, logistic regression was 
chosen given that each of the ICC variables are dichotomous indica-
tors.  Results are presented and discussed with regard to the Odds 
Ratios (ORs), with ORs statistically larger than 1.00 indicating 
higher scores on predictor variables are associated with greater sup-
port for the ICC, and ORs statistically smaller than 1.00 indicating 
higher scores on predictor variables are associated with less support 
for the ICC.  Each of the three models to be discussed included each 
of the demographic and worldview variables in order to assess the 
direct effect of each variable on the corresponding ICC-related out-
come after parceling out the influence of each of the other variables. 
Model 1 of Table 4 presents the Odds Ratios for predicting re-
spondent support for having the U.S. participate in the ICC.  Three 
of the eight ORs are statistically significant.  In particular, partici-
pants who increasingly align themselves with Democrats (OR = 
1.18), who feel the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs 
(OR = 1.57), and who have an increasingly multilateral viewpoint 
(OR = 2.59) are more likely to feel the U.S. should participate in the 
ICC.  The previously significant effects for respondent education 
and views on globalization found in Table 1 have been reduced to 
non-significance.  Turning attention to Model 2 predicting respond-
ent beliefs that the ICC needs to be strengthened, three of the eight 
ORs are statistically significant.  Specifically, respondents who make 
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more money are significantly less likely to feel the ICC needs 
strengthening (OR = 0.96), while those who increasingly align them-
selves with Democrats (OR = 1.13) and who have a more multilateral 
viewpoint (OR = 3.17) are significantly more likely to feel the ICC 
needs strengthening.  These results are consistent with those re-
ported in Table 2.  However, the effects for gender, race, and educa-
tion have been reduced to non-significance. 
 
 
The final model of Table 4 (Model 3) presents the results of the 
logistic regression predicting support for having suspected terror-
ists brought before the ICC.  Four of the eight ORs are statistically 
significant.  While Nonwhites are less likely to support having ter-
rorists brought before the ICC (OR = 0.61), respondents who increas-
ingly align themselves with Democrats  (OR = 1.19), who feel glob-
alization is a good thing (OR = 1.96), and who have a more 
multilateral viewpoint (OR = 2.39) are significantly more likely to 
support having terrorists brought before the ICC.  The previously 
significant effect for views on U.S. involvement in world affairs re-
ported in Table 3 has been reduced to non-significance. 
 
8.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has attempted to determine if United States foreign 
policy on the ICC reflects American public opinion as of 2010.  This 
is a very important question to address, since the ICC is the only 
permanent court established to prosecute the most serious crimes of 
Table 4. Logistic Regressions of Support for ICC
Variable OR SE OR SE OR SE
Age 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01
Male 0.97 0.17 0.83 0.13 0.76 0.15
Nonwhite 0.92 0.20 1.12 0.22 0.61* 0.13
Education Level 1.10 0.12 0.99 0.09 1.11 0.13
Income 1.00 0.02 0.96* 0.02 1.00 0.03
Alignment with Democrats 1.18** 0.06 1.13** 0.05 1.18** 0.06
Support for Globalization 1.17 0.21 0.99 0.16 1.96** 0.38
Active U.S. in World Affairs 1.57* 0.31 1.03 0.19 1.18 0.24
Multilateralism 2.59*** 0.49 3.17*** 0.54 2.39*** 0.52
F-Statistic
OR = Odds Ratio; SE = Standard Error; *p<.05, **p<.01; ***p<.001
Model 1: Support for 
U.S. Participation in 
the ICC (N = 1200)
7.92***
Model 2: Support for 
Strengthening the ICC 
(N=1176)
Model 3: Support for 
Bringing Terrorists 
Before the ICC (N = 1178)
9.83*** 7.62***
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international concern, and United States foreign policy should re-
flect the positions of the American people.   
According to the results of our analysis of the 2010 Global Views 
survey, current U.S. foreign policy does not appear to reflect Amer-
ican public opinion on U.S. participation in the ICC.   In particular, 
we found that a clear majority of the U.S. public supports U.S. par-
ticipation in the ICC.  This was true even among individuals who 
identify themselves as strongly Republican.  Even greater support 
among the U.S. public was found for having the ICC try terrorists.  
These findings are notable, given prior studies (the 2003 PEW Study 
and the 2005 Gallup Study) found that a majority of the U.S. public 
was unsupportive of the ICC.  Thus, within the span of only a dec-
ade, there appears to have been a notable shift in public sentiment 
surrounding the ICC. 
When examining support for U.S. participation in the ICC, 
strengthening the ICC, and having the ICC try terrorists within a 
multivariate framework, two variables were consistent predictors. 
Specifically, individuals who increasingly align themselves with 
Democrats and who have an increasingly multilateral viewpoint are 
more likely to support the ICC, believe it needs to be strengthened, 
and agree that it should try terrorists.  
The findings of this study should be considered in light of a 
number of factors.  First, there is the question of how much the par-
ticipants, as well as the American public, are aware of the ICC's legal 
jurisdiction and procedure.  For example, would support for U.S. 
involvement with the ICC diminish if participants were aware that 
the ICC does not include some U.S. Constitutional protections, such 
as a trial by jury and protection against double jeopardy?  While 
these are sacred protections provided for in the U.S. Constitution, 
the Rome Statute is a mixture of legal practices within the interna-
tional community, and many states do not practice jury trials. 
Another important factor to consider is if the public’s opinion of 
domestic courts reflects its opinion of international courts.  Accord-
ing to credible commitment theorists, public support for interna-
tional courts should be high when support for their national courts 
are low.52  Yet, it is the contrary.  “[B]oth across and within countries 
citizens who trust their domestic courts more also have more trust 
in international courts,” thus “citizens see international courts not 
as substitutes for, but as extensions to the domestic rule of law.”53  
                                               
52 Voeten, supra note 4, at 414. 
53 Id.  
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While many members of minority groups show less confidence, 
most Americans “have at least a moderate amount of trust” in 
United States domestic courts.54  American public opinion of the ICC 
reflects its opinion of domestic courts.  Therefore, Americans who 
support greater U.S. participation in the ICC may see the court as an 
extension to American domestic courts rather than a separate inter-
national institution with its own rule of law.  
In addition, despite our effort, there still remains relatively little 
academic research concerning U.S. public opinion of the ICC.  Our 
research is only a small piece of the puzzle, and there are important 
things to consider moving forward.  In particular, future research 
should inform survey participants of the Rome Statute’s substantive 
and procedural laws prior to inquiring about their support for the 
ICC and its functions.  This should include describing the Rome Stat-
ute’s complementarity principle and its lack of U.S. Constitutional 
protections, as well as potential consequences on U.S. military oper-
ations if the court were to have jurisdiction over government offi-
cials and military service men and women.  Taking these steps may 
provide us with a more valid understanding of the public's in-
formed opinion of the ICC. 
In conclusion, this paper’s findings demonstrate that American 
public opinion of the ICC is positive, which indicates that United 
States public sentiment has shifted in recent years.  However, it is 
unlikely that United States foreign policy on the ICC will be re-
versed in the foreseeable future.  For now, the United States contin-
ues to work with the ICC when there is common interest.  In the 
meantime, more public discussion is needed between government 
officials and their constituents to work towards a proper foreign pol-
icy on the ICC that represents the American public opinion.  To this 
end, academic researchers have a responsibility to better inform 
government officials of research focused on public opinion. 
 
 
                                               
54 Public Trust and Confidence, Resource Guide, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Community/Public-Trust-and-Confi-
dence/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
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